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INTRODUCTION
Tens of thousands of people are vehemently shouting.' No
more sacrifices!2 No to the prosecution of the working classP
They are demanding that their government thwart its wage
decreases, pension cuts, and tax increases.4 Police officers,
1. See, e.g., Raphael Minder, Workers Across Europe Synchronize Protests. N.Y. TIMLS,
Nov. 15, 2012, at A8 (explaining that protests occurred in, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain, as well as France and Belgium); Protests Against Cuts Roil Dozens of Cities Official,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2010, at A8 (stating that protests took place across Europe
against austerity measures).
2. See, e.g., Greek Protestors Gather in Thousands Outside of Parliament, BBC NEW/s,
May 6, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/curope/8665904.stm (broadcasting one of
the many protests that took place in Athens, Greece); Spain Protests Turn Violent, CNN,
Sept. 30. 2012, hIIp://www.cnn.coi/video/#/video/world/2012/09/30/goodman-
spain-protest.cnn (reporting on the Spanish protests).
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing examples of Europeans
chanting to oppose austerity measures).
4. See, e.g., The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece 12-25 (Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Fur. Comm'n, Occasional Paper No. 61,
2010). available at http://cc.curopa.c /cconomyli)finance/publications/
occasional-paper/2010/pdf/ocp6lci.pdf (outlining the auseity measures agreed to
by the Greek government to receive a bailout); The Economic Adjuistment Programme for
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dressed in riot gear and armed with tear gas, gather to maintain
the peace.) Some protestors begin to throw rocks at the officers,
and the police respond by drenching the protestors with tear
gas. Within minutes, groups of individuals dressed in black
hooded sweatshirts infiltrate the demonstration to wage a street
battle against the police. 7 They throw Molotov cocktails, smash
store windows, and torch street benches.8 Eventually the riot
ends and the tens of thousands of peaceful protestors resume
their chanting.9
This image is not exclusive to one country."' The European
sovereign debt crisis has incited hundreds of demonstrations
across Europe." These types of demonstrations first began in
Greece-the catalyst for the outbreak of the European sovereign
debt crisis.12 Spreading from one vulnerable Eurozone country
Ireland 23-37 (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Eur. Comm'n,
Occasional Paper No. 76, 2011), available at http://cc.europa.eu/cconoimy-finance/
publications/occasional-paper/2011 /pdf/ocp76_en.pdf (providing the requirements
for receiving the bailout); The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal 18-28
(Directorate-Gcneral for Economic and Financial Affairs, Eur. Conm'n, Occasional
Paper No. 79, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu /economy_finance/ publications/
occasional-paper/2011 /pdf/ocp79_cn.pdf (stating the austerity imeasures that miust be
iiplementcd)
5. See Nicole Itano, Greek Austerity Measures Spark Rising Protests, TIME, Mar. 11,
2010, http://www.time.coim/tiimc/world/article/0,8599,1971491,00.htil [hereinafter
Itano-Protests] (discussing the peaceful demonstrations taking place outside of the
Greek Parliament where "groups of masked and hooded youths" clash with the police);
Greece Tightens its Belt to Obtain Rescue Loans, WASH. POST, May 7, 2010, at A20
(illustrating the violent protests that crupted).
6. See Itano-Protests, supra note 5 (illustrating the violence that occurred when
groups of masked and hooded youths" joined the dcionstration); Spain Protestors
Turn Violent, supra note 2 (presenting the conflict between Spanish police and
protestors).
7. See Itano-Protests supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing a description
of the protests).
8. See id.
9. See supra note 2 and acconpanying text (showing that protestors pcaccfully
asscmblcd outside of governmcnt buildings).
10. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing the protests occurring
throughout Europc).
11. See supra note 1 and acconpanying text (noting that denonstrations have
occurred in Portugal, Greece, and Italy, as well as France and Belgium).
12. See Loukas Tsoukalis, Greece in the Euro Area: Odd Man Out, or Precursor of
Things to Come?, in RLSOLVING THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS 19, 19 (William R. Cline &
Guntram 11. Wolff eds., 2012) ("Greece has acted as a catalyst for the outbreak of the
crisis of the Euro area, following the bursting of the big bubble in the Western financial
system."); see also Elizabeth Espinosa, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: How the EU
Legal Structure Limits and Shapes Responses 7-13 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic
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to the next, Greece's financial distress developed into the
European sovereign debt crisis.'
As the credit agencies downgraded Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus' credit ratings, it became impossible
for these countries to access international markets.14 As a result,
these countries could not manage their respective debts and
deficits.1 To avoid the collapse of the Eurozone, Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus needed financial assistance
from the European Union.'1 Thus, in April 2010, Greece
Technology Law Forum, European Union Law Working Paper No. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.1aw.stanford.edu /sit es/default /files/ child-page/ 205024/doc/sispublic/
espinosaeulawvp6.pdf (discussing how the sovereign debt crisis spread from Greece to
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain).
13. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4, at 11 (" Financial
distress in Greece spreads to other [E]uro-area Members (Portugal, Spain and Ireland)
mainly through an increase in investors' perception of sovereign risk.").
14. See, e.g., Pedro Lourtic, U nderstandingPortugal in the Context oftheEuro Crisis, in
RESOTVING THE EL ROPEAN DEBT CRISTS 51, 86 (William R. (line & GuntramI B. Wolff
eds., 2012) (sunmarizing that international mairkct investors r cacted badly to political
instability and began lowering Portugal's rating, which caused interest rates for
Portuguese bonds to soar); Aristea Koukiadaki & Lefteris Kretsos, Opening Pandora's
Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Labour M4arket Regulation in Greece, 41 IN)US. L..
276, 281-82 (2012) (explaining that Grecce could not access international bond
markets after the lowering of its credit ratings); Caoimhin MacMaolhin, Ramifications of
the EU/IF Loan to Ireland for the Financial Serices Sector and for Irish Law and Society, in
17 EUR. PLB. L. 287, 389 (PatrickJ. Birkinshaw ed., 2011) (noting that the Irish housing
bubble caused the credit rating agencies to downgrade Ireland, which "in turn rnade
the Cost of borrowing to pay existing debts more expansive and ultimately
unaffordable"); Opprus Credit Ratings Cut by Fitch on Greek Debt Fears. BBC NEWS, May 31,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/nevs/business-13598585 ("Fitch cut Cyprus's rating to A-
from AA- on concerns that its banks may face losses on the money they lent to
Grcece.").
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining the repercussions of the
credit agencies' downgrades).
16. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4, at 14 (indicating
that the European Union must bailout member states because the fear of contagion
spreads to other Eurozone countries and raises doubts about the sustainability of the
curo). The Eurozone is the group of European member states that have adopted the
Euro as their currency; see also Roger j. Goebel, Economic Governance in the European
Union: Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth in the Stabilit and Growth Pact?, 31
FoRDIHAM INT'L LJ. 1266. 1266-76 (2007) (defining the term Eurozonc); Rosa M.
Lastra, The Evolution of the Europea Cental Bank, 35 FORDHAM INT'l L.J. 1260, 1261
(2012) ("The [E]uro area or Eurozone comprises the EU Member States Whose
currency is the [E]uro and in which a single monetary policy is conducted by the ECB
[European Central Bank].").
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requested a bailout, followed by Ireland in November 2010,
Portugal in April 2011, and Spain and Cyprus in June 2012.1
Prior to the sovereign debt crisis, the Eurozone had existed
for eleven years without being involved in a bailout. 8 In fact,
there was "no rulebook for how [a bailout] should be done." 9
Nonetheless, to save the Euro, the European Commission
("EC"), the European Central Bank ("ECB"), and the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), commonly referred to as
the troika, agreed to bailout Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
and Cyprus.2o In exchange for the loan, each country signed
Memoranda of Understanding ("MoU"), agreeing to implement
severe austerity measures.21 These MoU demanded significant
17. See Kevin Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU- The Failing
State in a SkewedRegime, 49J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 193, 202 (2011) (stating that Greece
asked for a bailout on April 23, 2010): The Economic Adjustment Programmefor Portugal,
supra note 4, at 4 (acknowledging that Portugal requested a bailout on April 7, 2011);
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, supra note 4, at 5 (reporting that Ireland
requested a bailout on November 21, 2010); Raphael Minder & Dan Bilefsky, Spain and
Cyprus Seek Rescue for Ailing Banks, N.Y. TIMES, June 26. 2012, at B3 (identifying Spain
and Cyprus as the fourth and fifth countries to request a bailout in June 2012);
Jonathan House & Alkiman Granitsas, Spain and Cyprus Request Bailout Aid, June 26,
2012, UX ALL ST.J., at All (stating that Spain and Cyprus requested a bailout on June 25,
2012); Niki Kitsantonis & Matthew Salmarsh, Greece, Out oJ Ideas Requests Global Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 2010, at II1 ("Describing his country's econory as 'a sinking ship,'
Greece's [P]rinc [M]inistLer formally requested an international bailout on Friday
[April 23, 2010], creating the biggest test so far to the European monetary union.").
18. See Henry Farrell & John Quiggin, How to Save the Euro-and the EU 90
FORLIGN ALL. 96, 96 (2011) (explaining that the European Union created the
European Financial Stability Facility to bailout Greece and other troubled Eurozone
states to stop the contagion fron spreading); Nicole Itano, Europe Talks Bailout Plan for
Greece-and the Euro, TIME, Feb. 10, 2010. available at http://www.tilc.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1963410,00.html [hereinafter Itano, Bailout] ("If a bailout is
agreed upon, it would be the first timie in the 11-year history of the [E] urozoine this has
happened - and there's no rulcbook for how it should be done."). In 2012. the
European Stability Mechanism ("ESM") replaced the European Financial Stability
Facility. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 2012 T/ESM
[hereinafter ESM].
19. Itano, Bailout, supra note 18.
20. See Koukiadaki. supra note 14, at 276 (identifying the troiLa as European
Commission ("E(), the European Central Bank ("ECB"), and the Inteirnational
Monetary Fund ("IMF"); Horen Voskeritsian & Andreas Kornelakis, Int itutional Change
in Greek Industrial Relations in an Era of Fiscal Crisis 1 (Hellenic Observatory London
School of Economics, Paper No. 52, 2011) (Stating that the troika-the EC, ECB, and
IMF-provided the bailout funds).
21. See generally The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4: The
Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (Eur. Comm11'n, Occasional Papers No.
94, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/publications/
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changes to member state labor law, in addition to several other
structural reforms 22
As the first bailout country, Greece initiated the protest
movement against the MoU's wage decreases, pension cuts, and
tax increases. The MoU, however, will have a greater effect on
the working class than most protestors understood at the time.24
The MoU's demand for labor law reform threatens the workers'
right to bargain collectively for fair wages and better benefits.25
occasionalpaper/2012/pdf/ocp9 4 _en.pdf; The Economic Adju s.tm Programme fo
Ireland, supra note 4; The Economic Adjustment Progrmme for Portugal supra note 4; The
Financial Sector Adjustmen t Programm fr Spain 2 ()irectorate-G eneral for Economic and
Financial Affairs, Eur. Comin'n, Occasional Paper No. 118, 2012), available at
http://cc.curopa.cu/cconomyy-finance/publications/occasional-paper/2012/
opl 18_en.htm; The Economic Adjustment Programme fr Cyprus (Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Afairs, Eur. Comin'n, Occasional Papers No. 149, 2013).
available at http://cc.uropa.uctonomyyfinance/publications/occasional-paper/
2013/pdf/ocp 149_en.pdf.
22. See Catherine Barnard, The Financial Crisis and the Euro Plus Pact: A Labour
Lawyer's Perspective, 41 INDLS. L.J. 98. 98 (2012) (" [I]n the case of states which have
received a 'bail-out' (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal): the accompanying Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) make it clear that key reforms of labour law are necessary as a
condition for receiving financial assistance from the [European Union] and the
[International Monetary Fund]."); see generall The Economc Adjustment Programme fir
Greece. supra note 4: The Economic Adjustment Proranmme for Ireland, supra note 4. The
European Union did not demand changes to Spain's labor as law, as the MoU only
involved restricting of its banking structure. See generally The Finatial Secto Adjustment
Progranmefor Spain supra note 21.
23. See Greece Tightens its Belt to Obtain Rescue Loans, supra note 5 (describing the
protests that took place in Athens, Greece in response to Parliarnent's approval of the
austerity measures); Dcmetris Ncllas, MWay Day Protests in Greece Erupt in Violence:
Demonstrations Target Anticipated Cutes and Tax Hikes, BOSTON GLOBAL, May 2, 2010, at
A3 (illustrating the violent protests that erupted on International Labor )ay-May 1-
in 2010 against the anticipated spending Cuts that Parliament would announce "to win
support" for the bailout).
24. Compare Greece Tightens its Belt to Obtain Rescue Loans, supra note 5, and Nellas,
supra note 23 (stating that the Greeks protested against the anticipated spending Cuts
and tax increases) , with The Economic Adjustment Programmefor Greece, supra note 4, at 68
(demanding that Greece transform its labor relations system to provide employers wvith
greater power to Set wages).
25. See Nonos (2011:4024) Suntaksiodotikes ruthniscis, cniaio Inisthologio-
vathmologio, ergasiaki efedreia kai alles diatakseis efarmogis tol mesoprothesmo
plaisiou dinosionomikis stratigikis 2012-2015 [Pension arrangements, single payroll,
job redundancy and other provisions for the implementation of the medium-tern fiscal
strategy framework for 2012-2015], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNFFOS TES HELI.ENTKES
DEMOEIRATIAS [E.KE.D.] 2012. A:226 (Greece) (inplncnting the labor law reform
policies of the Memoranda of U1 ndcrsi anding ("MoU") to climinate the employee-
friendly labor relations system that previously dominated in Greece for twenty years).
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This Note analyzes the European Union's response to the
sovereign debt crisis and its effect on Greek labor law. This Note
recognizes that by signing the MoU, Greece agreed to
implement the proscribed labor law reform to receive the IMF
and European Union ("EU") bailout.26 The issue that this Note
seeks to explore is whether the European Union has the
authority to demand labor law reform on a member state, as well
as the effect of labor law reform on Greece.
Part I of this Note summarizes the EU treaties and
economic policies that determine the European Union's scope
of authority for imposing austerity measures in exchange for
bailouts, in addition to describing the ignition of the European
sovereign debt crisis. In Part 11, this Note explains how the
European Union's bailout measures transformed the Greek
labor relations system. Finally, Part III argues that the European
Union lacks the authority to demand changes to Greek labor
law, in addition to concluding that the labor relations system
imposed by the MoU is not only a misguided austerity measure
but it also creates a power imbalance in favor of Greek
employers.
I. GREECE AND THE EUROPEAN S 0 VEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
Part I provides the background for exploring the European
Union's authorization of imposing austerity measures as a
condition for the bailouts. First, Part L.A summarizes the
fundamental EU treaties and economic policies that determine
the scope of the European Union's authority. Part I.B discusses
the development of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. Next,
Part I.C explains how the Greek debt crisis spread to Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus. Finally, Part I.D addresses the
severe austerity measures imposed by the European Union on
the five bailout countries-Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and
Cyprus.
26. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (acknowledging that Greece
voluntarily signed the MoU with the European Union and tie IMF to change its labor
law in exchange for a bailout).
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A. European Union Treaties and Economic Policies Determine TMhether
Member State Bailouts and Austerity Measures Are Permissible
Prior to enduring the effects of the European sovereign
debt crisis, each Eurozone country signed the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on
European Union to eventually establish the Economic and
Monetary Union. 2 After several countries adopted the Euro, the
Eurozone countries also agreed to uphold the economic policies
of the Stability and Growth Pact28 These fundamental treaties
and policies govern the scope of the European Union's
authority. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union determines whether the European Union has the
authority to bailout a member state.so If such authority exists,
the Treaty on European Union and the Stability and Growth
Pact determine whether the European Union has the authority
to impose changes to member state labor law in exchange for a
bailout.
1. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007,
the European Union created the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union ("TFEU").3 2 TFEU Article 122 and 125
27. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2010 0j C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union, 2010 Oj C 83/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
28. Council Resolution of 17 june 1997, 1997 O.J C 236/1 (Stability and Growth
Pact).
29. See generall TFEU, supra note 27, 2010 Oj C 83; TEU post-Lisbon, supra note
27, 2010 0] C 83; Council Resolution of 17 june 1997, supra note 28, 1997 0.1 C
236/1.
30. TFEU, supra note 27. arts. 122, 125. 2010 O.J C 83. at 98-99.
31. See infra Part LA 2-3 (discussing the European Union authority under the
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") and the Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP")).
32. See Boris Ryvkin, Saving the Euro: Tensions with European Treaty Law in the
European UInion's Efforts to Protect the Common Currency, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 228, 233
(2012) (idcntifying the TFEU as one of the two fundamental EU treatics); Treaty on the
Functioning of Europe, EUROFOUND, http://www.curofound.curopa.cu/areas/
industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/
treaty onthefunctioningofthecuropcanunion.htmi (last updated Feb. 7. 2012) (stating
that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") camtle into force
on December 1, 2009 following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which made
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determine whether the European Union has the authority to
bailout a member state., TFEU Article 122 authorizes a bailout
if a member state "is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional
occurrences beyond its control."34 Article 125, on the other
hand, forbids the European Union from "assum [ing] the
commitments of central governments.". Consequently, the
TFEU creates some tension regarding member state bailouts.
While Article 125 seems to prohibit member state bailouts,
Article 122 authorizes bailouts under certain conditions@
Once the European sovereign debt crisis emerged,
however, the European Council amended the TFEU to grant
Eurozone states the ability to establish a mechanism for
providing bailouts. 7 The European Council amended TFEU
Article 136 as follows: "The Member States whose currency is the
[E]uro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the [E]uro area as a
whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under
the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality."
Faced with an unprecedented financial crisis, the seventeen
Eurozone states utilized Article 136 to establish the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) to bailout Eurozone states.30
The ESM required that financially distressed Eurozone
states seeking bailouts sign MoU detailing the conditionality of
their loans.40 Upon review of the ESM in Thomas v. Ireland, the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that the ESM is
consistent with TFEU Article 125's no bailout provision.4' The
ECJ reasoned that Article 125's aim is "to ensure that the
[m]ember [s]tates follow a sound budgetary policy."42 The ECJ
amendments to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community).
33. TFEU, supra note 27. arts. 122, 125. 2010 0.J C 83. at 98-99.
34. Id. art. 122, at 98.
35. Id. art. 125, at 99.
36. See TFEU, supra note 27, art 122, 125. 2010 0.J C 83. 98-99 (presenting the
tension between TFEU Articles 122 and 125).
37. Council Decision No 2011/199/EU (Stability Mechanism), 2011 01 L 91/1.
38. Id.
39. See generally ESM, supra note 18.
40. ESM, supra note 18, art. 13(3), 2012 T/ESM, at 29.
41. Thomas Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012].
42. Id. 135.
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explained that Article 125 is "not intended to prohibit either the
[European] Union or the [m]ember [s]tates from granting any
form of financial assistance . . . to another [m]ember
[s]tate[,]" as this would be inconsistent with TFEU Article 122.43
The ECJ, therefore, concluded that the European Union has the
authority to bailout a member state.
2. Treaty on European Union
Once the TFEU authorized member state bailouts, the
Treaty on the European Union ("TEU") then applies to
determine whether the European Union has the authority to
demand changes to member state labor law as a condition of the
bailout.44 EU member states signed the TEU on February 7,
1992, agreeing to "establish an economic and monetary union
whose currency will be the [E]uro." 45
For a member state to adopt the Euro, it needed to satisfy
the European Monetary Union ("EMU") convergence criteria:
(1) high degree of price stability, (2) sustainable government
finances, (3) proper exchange rates, and (4) long-term interest
rates .4 As explained by Professor Roger Goebel, a well-
recognized academic in EU law, no aspect of the TEU is of
greater importance than the EMU provision; "it bound together
in an unprecedented way the destinies of many European
nations."'14
More specifically, member states agreed to transfer parts of
their sovereignty to the European Union in order to achieve
economic integration. 48 To prevent the complete elimination of
43. Id. 1 130.
44. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 27, arts. 3, 5, 2010 OJ C 83, at 17-18.
45. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 27, art. 3, 2010 0. C 83, at 17.
46. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Conuunity art
121. 2002 0j C 325/33, at 85 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
47. Franco Pavoncello, Onefor All. All fr One: The Euro Crisis, 174 WORiD AFF. 59,
59 (2011); See MATTHEW LYNN, BUST: GREECE, THF EURO, AN) THE SOVEREIGN I)FBT
C(usis 19-20 (2011) (noting that Maastricht, the city where the TEU was signed, is best
known as the city in which the Euro was born); Andrej Fatur, W1hat Challenges Do the
Central European and Aediterranean States Face in Trying to join the Third Stage of the
European Union?, 28 FORD-HAM1 INT'L L.J. 145, 153 (2004) (noting that Fordham
professor Roger Goebel wrote that the EMU is the most important provision of the
TEU).
48. TFEU, supra note 27, art. 3, 2010 0.J C 83, at 51 (listing the areas of exclusive
European Union competence, where the member states have agreed to relinquish
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member state sovereignty, the TEU established the principle of
subsidiarity.4 Under this principle, the European Union may act
in areas outside of its exclusive competence only if the
"objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the [m]ember [s]tates . . . but can rather, by
reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at the [European] Union level." 0 The TFEU does not
list labor law as an area of exclusive competence.51 To authorize
changes to member state labor law, the European Court of
Justice must, therefore, conclude that labor law is best
determined at the EU level.5
3. Stability and Growth Pact
When eleven member states in 1997 satisfied the EMU
convergence criteria and adopted the Euro as their joint
currency, Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl negotiated
the Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP").) Among other
provisions, the SGP requires that the Eurozone states meet
certain fiscal obligations to ensure that states maintain budget
discipline to avoid excessive deficits.54 More specifically, the SGP
sovereignty); see Kees Van Kersbergen & Berjan Verbeek, The Politis ofJ Subsidiarty ir the
European LUnion, 32 J. COMMON MKT. STUD., 215, 218 (1994) (explaining that joining
the European Union required transferring bits of member state sovereignty over to the
European Union because certain tasks could no longer be performed efliciently by
national governments).
49. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 27, art. 5, 2010 OJ C 83, at 18.
50. Id. The areas of exclusive competence are listed as the following: customs
union, establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the
internal market, monetary policy for the member states whose currency is the Euro,
conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy, and
common commercial policy. TFEU, supra note 27, art. 3, 2010 0J C 83, at 51.
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing the areas of exclusive
competence).
52. Id. (Citing the TEU to explain when the European Union may act outside its
area of exclusive competence).
53. Council Resolution of 17 june 1997, supra note 28, 1997 0J C 236/ 1; see
Goebel, supra note 16., at 1267-68 (explaining that Chancellor Kohl negotiated the
SGP) because Germany was concerned that "somte states that joined the Eurozone in
the final stage of the Monetary Union might subsequently adopt lax budgetary policies
that would harm the overall monetary stability of the Eurozone"); Ryvkin, supra note
32, at 227 (emphasizing that Chancellor Kohl convinced German voters to join the
Euro by negotiating the SGP).
54. Council Resolution of 17 June 1997, supra note 28, 1997 O.J C 236/1
(establishes that Eurozone states must send an annual stability/convergenice report to
the European Commission, in addition to prohibiting Eurozone state budget deicits
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prohibits member state budget deficits from exceeding three
percent of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). 5 If a member
state's budget deficit exceeds three percent of GDP, the SGP
requires that each member state-not the European Union-
"take[s] the corrective budgetary action they deem necessary to
meet the objectives of their stability or convergence."56
To join the Eurozone, each Eurozone country agreed to the
provisions of the TFEU, the TEU, and the SGP.57 These
fundamental treaties and economic policies, therefore, govern
the scope of the European Union's authority.5 As a result, these
agreements determine whether the European Union has the
authority to alleviate the effects of the European sovereign debt
crisis by requiring changes to member state labor law in
exchange for a bailout.59
B. Disclosures by a Newly Elected Greek Government Incite the Debt
Crisis in Greece
The European sovereign debt crisis broke out on October
20, 2009, when Greece's newly elected government, led by
George Papandreou of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
("PASOK"), announced that the previous conservative
government, New Democracy, severely misreported the
country's 2009 fiscal statistics to the European Union.c0 The
from exceeding three percent of GDP); see Patrick M. Crowley, The Stability and Growth
Pact: Bad Economics and/or the Politics of Least Resistance? 2-3 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://aci.pitL.edu/317/1/SGP>3-06.pdf ("On one level the SGP is clearly a Set of
procedures for monitoring fiscal policies of member states so that coordination can
take place in the contCxt of the economic inter-dependencies within EMU, but on
another level the pact contains explicit rules governing limits for the outcome of
macroeconomic policy to more clearly define the excessive deficit procedure contained
in the Maastricht Treaty (of the European C ominunities (1992)) which was part of a set
of criteria to foster economic convergence before EMU.").
55. Council Resolution of 17 june 1997, supra note 28, 1997 OJ C 236/ 1, at 1-2.
56. Council Resolution of 17 June 1997, supra note 28, 1997 O.J C 236/1. at 1-2
(emphasis added).
57. See upra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (citing the TFEU, the TEU, and
the SGP).
58. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (referring to the European
Union fundamental treaties and economic policies).
59. See supra Part I.A.1-3 (discussing the European Union's scope of authority).
60. See Featherstone, supra note 17, at 199 (statig tLha[ George PapakonsLantinou,
the newly elected Panhellenic Socialist Movement ("PASOK") finance minister,
20131 GREEK SOIEREIGN DEBT & LABOR REL4TIONS 1529
deficit for 2009 was increased from 3 .7% to 12.5%, and
eventually to an overwhelming 15. 8 % of GDP, adding to an
already large public debt of 114.7% of GDP.61
Greece's economic distress partly stems from the
government's irresponsibility.6 When Greece adopted the Euro
in 2001, public spending soared, as the government exploited its
access to low interest rates." In fact, public sector wages
increased by approximately a hundred percent between 2000
and 2008 to C27,480 million-11.4% of GDP.64 While public
spending increased during this period, widespread tax evasion
occurred.65 Reports state that the total amount of unpaid taxes
announced a tripling of the 2009 debt); Manos Matsagonis, Social Policy in Hard Times:
The Case of Greece, 32 CRITICAlI SOC. POL'Y 406, 406-07 (2012) (emphasizing the size of
the fiscal statistical crror reported by the previous conscrvation government).
61. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON GREEK GOVERNIENT DEFICIT AND
DEBT STATISTICs 3 (2010), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITYPUBLIC/COM_2010_ REPORT GREEK/EN/COM_2010_REPORT GREEK-
EN.PDF (criticizing the unreliability of Greek fiscal reports by explaining howe Greece
revised its 2009 deficit from 3.7% to 12.5% of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP")); Bank
of Greece, Sumnary of the Annual Report. 34 (2011), available at
http:/,/m .bankofgreece.gr/iBogEkdoseis/SurnmaryAnnrep2011 .pdf [hereinafter
Bank of Greece 2011 Report] (increasing the 2009 deficit to 15.8% in 2011). Compare
Bank of Greece, Summany of the Annual Report, 43 (2009), available at
http:/,/mmybankofgreece.gr/BogliEkdoseis/SurnmaryAnnrep2009.pdf (reporting the
2009 consolidated debt of the general government at 114.7% of GDP), and Bank of
Greece, Summay of the Annual Report 36 (2010), available at
http:/,/mmybankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/SurnmaryAnnrep2010.pdf (increasing the
2009 consolidatcd debt to 216.8% of GDP), with Bank of Greece 2011 Report, supra
note 61 (raising Greece's 2009 public debt to 129.4% of GDP).
62. See LYNN, supra note 47, at 115-16 (discussing Greece's fiscal irresponsibility
upon joining the Eurozone): Tsoukalis, supra note 12, at 23-24 (identifying Greece's
irresponsibility as a primary cause of the debt crisis). Greece's economic distress is also
partly caused by the European Union's failure to implement an adequate economic
surveillance system. See Tsoukalis, supra note 12, at 24 (recognizing that EU institutions
also caused the debt crisis); Paul Krugnian, Greece as Victim, N.Y. TIMLS, June 18, 2012,
at A23 ("So Greece, although not without sin, is mainly in trouble thanks to the
arrogance of European officials, mostly from richer countries, who convinced
themselves that they could make a single currency work without a single government.
And these same officials have made the situation even worse by insisting, in the teeth of
the evidence, that all the currency's troubles were caused by irresponsible behavior on
the part of those Southern Europeans, and that everything would work out if only
people were willing to suffer some more.").
63. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that public spending
drastically soae -d when Gr ecec adopted the Euro).
64. The Eono1i Adjutment Progranme for Greece, supra note 4.
65. See LYN., supra note 47, at 120 (providing an exampic of how Greece
contributed to the crisis by failing to implement an effective tax systeml-only 324
residents paid swimming pool taxes in a prosperous suburb of Athens, compared to the
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accumulated to approximately twenty-five percent of Greece's
GDP.66 After years of overspending and failing to implement an
effective tax collection system, Greece's budget deficit-the
difference between government spending and income-spiraled
out of control.67 When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008
causing a global financial crisis, however, Greece could no
longer hide its deficit and debt levels.61
The corrections in Greece's fiscal reports caused investors
in international markets to fear that Greece was dangerously
close to defaulting on its foreign borrowing. 0 The credit
agencies, starting with Fitch, began downgrading Greece's credit
rating.1o By early 2011, all three agencies had downgraded
Greece's credit to junk status.71 Consequently, the international
16,974 residences who owned pools when viewing a satellite image of the area); Finance
And Economics: Dues and Don'ts, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 2010, at 62 (recognizing that
Greece, as well as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, experience tax evasion).
66. SeeJanes Surowiecki, Dodger Alania, NEW YORKER, jul 11, 2011, at 38 (stating
that tax evasion amounted to a little over twenty-five percent of GDP); Liz Alderman &
Rachel Dionadio, Greek Tax Scandal Diverts Attention From the Countny's Shortfall in
Collections, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A6 (" [T]otal unpaid taxes amounted to nearly
C70 billion, about 25 percent of Greece's gross domestic product.").
67. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (stating the statistics and causes
of Greece's deficit and debt levels).
68. See George Soros, Does the Euro Have a Future?, in RESOLING THE EUROPEAN
DEBT CRISIS 257, 257(William R. Cline & Guntran B. Wolff cds., 2012) (pointing to the
collapse of Lehman Brothers as the cause of the European sovereign debt crisis);
COSTAS LAPAITAS ET AL., CRISTS IN THE EUROZONE 5-6 (2012) (explaining that the
collapse of Lehman Brothers caused speculators to focus on Greek debt).
69. See Norris Floyd, A Greek Bearing Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at lil
(reporting that investors in the intcrnational markets have lost confidence that Greece
will be able to pay its debts); Greece Warned About Credit Rating BBC NEWS, Dec. 7. 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8400773.stm ("Greece's new government has
acknowledged growing fears about its ability to pay its debts . . . .").
70. See JoAnne Norton. Fitch Downgrades Greece to BBB+; Outlook Negative,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2009, http:w//Nwy.bloomberg.com/apps/news-pid=newsarchive&
sid-awvPloN5irEkE (reporting that Fitch downgraded Greece to BBB+ from A-);
Standard and Poor Downgrades Greece. WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009,
http://wiT.washingtontimes.comnnews/2009/dec/ 17/s-and-p-dowv ngrades-greece/
?page all (reporting that Standard & Poor's downgraded Greece's credit rating on
December 16, 2009); Greece's Debt Rating Downgraded by Third Agency, BBC NLws, Dec.
27, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426085.stmn (explaining that Moody's, the
third of the three credit agciics, downgraded Greece on Dec 22, 2009).
71. See Greece Credit Status Downgraded to Junk, BBC NEWS. Apr. 27, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8647903.stn (reporting that Standard & Poor's
downgraded Greece's credit to junk status on April 27, 2010); MWoody's Downgrades Greek
Debt to Junk Status, WVASH. TIMES, Juie 14, 2010, http://www.washingtoiiics.comi/
news/2010/jun/14./moodys-downgrades-greek-debt-junk-status/(noting that Moody's
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markets stopped investing in Greece, as it was considered too
highly indebted.72 Investors' fear of investing in a highly
indebted country would potentially create a vicious circle: if
investors stopped purchasing Greek bonds, Greece would be
unable to pay creditors to reduce its budget deficit, which would
harm investor confidence.7 1
C. International Markets React to the Greek Debt Crisis and Spread A
Fear of Contagion Throughout Europe
While Greece may have created its debt crisis by acting
fiscally irresponsible, the Greek economy was not in a unique
position in 2009.4 Several other Eurozone countries were also
suffering from high budget deficits.75 In 2008, Ireland had
experienced a housing bubble and credit burst, which forced
the Irish government to bailout the private banks.7 6 As a result,
downgraded Greece to junk status on june 14, 2010); Third Rating Agency Downgrades
Greece Sovereign Debt to junk, GU -ARDIAN (U. K.), jan. 14, 2011,
http://wmy.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/14/ratings-agency-downgrades-greek-
sovereign-debt-junk (reporting that Fitch downgraded Greece tojunk status on January
14, 2011).
72. See LYNN, supra note 47, at 2 (explaining that "capital markets were no longer
interested in buying Greek bonds" because Greece was too highly indebted);
Koukiadaki, supra note 14, at 281 (indicating that Greece could not access the
international bond market due to the lowering of its credit rating).
73. See Eurozone Crisis Explained, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2012,
http://w,.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000s ("If Grecce does not repay its
creditors, a dangerous precedent will have been set. This may make investors
increasingly nervous about the likelihood of other highly-indebted nations, such as
Italy, or those with weak econonics, such as Spain, repaying their debts or even staying
inside the curo. If investors stop buying bonds issued by other governments, then those
governments in turn will not be able to repay their creditors - a potentially disastrous
vicious circle").
74. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (stating the causes of the Greck
debt crisis); see also The Econ omic Adustment Prog-rme Jo Greece, supra note 4, at 11
(identifying Spain and Ircland as having large debts and deficits, in addition to
recognizing financial distress in Portugal); Tsoukalis, supra note 12, at 35 ("Euro
leaders hoped in May 2010 that Greece would be a unique case requiring special
treatment. They were proved wrong a few months later, when other countries followed
Grecce asking for European support.... Many of the problens Grecce is facing are far
from unique.").
75. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (recognizing the financial distress
thiroughout Europe).
76. See Alan Ahearne, Political-Econonic Context in Ireland, in RESOLVING THE
EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIs 37. 37. 42 (William R. Cline & Guntiram B. Wolff eds., 2012)
(explaining tha[ the Irish housing bubble and related credit boomn that occurred in
2008 resulted in a bailout of the banking sector); MacMaoldin, supra note 14, at 388-89
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Ireland's budget deficit significantly increased.77 Unsettled by
the Greek crisis, international market investors became
concerned with Ireland's high deficit and caused "yields on Irish
government debt [to rise] to unsustainable levels." 7 ,
The European sovereign debt crisis then spread to
Portugal, where the deficit increased to 9.3% of GDP in 2009.7
In response to the Greek crisis, Portugal implemented several
austerity measures to lower its deficit.80 When the government
rejected the fourth austerity package, the credit agencies began
downgrading Portugal's credit ratings, causing Portuguese
interest rates to soar."'
Similar to Ireland, Spain experienced a housing bubble
burst, which caused its budget deficit to increase to 11.2% of
GDP in 2009.8 To avoid suffering the fate of Greece, Ireland,
and Portugal, Spain implemented several austerity measures.83
(noting that the "majority of debt now owed by Ireland previously belonged to private
banks and building societies," as Ireland "guarantccd all of the obligations of the main
banks" in September 2008 after the housing bubble burst).
77. See Ahearne, supra note 76, at 37 (stating that Irish economic activity has
slumped since 2008 duc to the housing bubble deflation, which caused the deficit to
rise to over ten percent of GDP); see also Espinosa, supra note 12, at 12 (recording that
the deficit rose to over ten percent of GDP).
78. Ahcarne, supra note 76, at 38; see Espinosa, pra note 12. at 12 (Ireland's
cost of borrowing soared to levels only surpassed by Grcccc.").
79. See Lourtie, supra note 14, at 87 (recording the public deficit at 9.3% of GI);
see also Jorgc Miguel Fernandes, The 2011 Portuguese Election: Looking for a Way Out, 34
W. EUR. POL. 1296, 1297 (2012) (identifying the budget deficit at ten percent of GDP
- the highest in the last 160 years).
80. See Espinosa, supra note 12, at 13 ("When the debt crisis hit, Portugal's
interest rates began to rise and its government enacted several rounds of austerity Cuts
while the economy fell into a recession."); Fernandes, supra note 79, at 1297
(indicating that the Portuguese government had inipleincntcd three austerity packages
prior to requesting a bailout).
81. See Lourtie, supra note 14, at 86 ("[M]arkets . . . reacted badly to political
instability, and interest rates for Portuguese bonds soared."); Fernandes, supra note 79
(explaining that Portugal was forced to request a bailout, as it was faced with the risk of
not meeting international debt obligations).
82. See Guillermo dc la Dchcsa, Spain and the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis, in
RESOLVING THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 109. 120-22 (William R. (line &
Guntrarn B. Wolff eds., 2012) (criticizing the Spanish government for failing to prevent
the housing bubble); Espinosa, supra note 12, at 13 (reporting Spanish deficit at 11.2%
of GDP in 2009).
83. See Dehesa, supra note 82, at 120-21 (describing the difterent types of
structural reforms pursued by Spain); Espinosa, supra note 12, at 14 ("The Spanish
Prime Minister, Jose Luis Zapatcro, passed an austerity package designed to cut the
deficit to six percent in 2011 ").
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Spanish interest rates, however, continued to increase across
international markets. 4
Cyprus, on the other hand, experienced "a long period of
high growth, low unemployment, and sound public finances"
prior to 2008.85 It was unfortunately directly affected by the
Greek debt crisisb Cypriot banks had made loans to Greek
borrowers worth 160% of GDP.87 When the value of the debts
owed by the Greek government was decreased due to the debt
crisis in Greece, the Cypriot banks were hit hard.8 8
Once the investors in international markets discovered the
financial vulnerability in the Eurozone, a "fear of contagion"
spread throughout Europe." Many theorized that if Greece were
forced to declare bankruptcy, this would result in a domino
effect, where the sovereign debt crisis would spread from one
vulnerable Eurozone country to another, ultimatelyjeopardizing
the future of the Euro.Oo To thwart this fear, on February 11,
84. See Espinosa. upra note 12, at 14 (stating that Spanish interest rates
continued to rise, even though the government passed austerity packages); Spain's
Borrowing Costs Hit 14-Year High, BBC NFWs, Nov. 7, 2011,
http://wm,.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15771776 ( has to, nav an i  terest rat or
6.975%X', the h 'ighest since 1997."1).
85. Paul Ki rugman, The Conscience of a Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, available
at http: //krugnan.blogs. nytims.com /2013 /03/ 18/island -nightnares/; see Q&A:
Cyprus Bailout, BBC NFWS, Mar. 23, 2012, http:,// wy.bbc.co.uk/news/wvorld-europe-
21817197 (referring to the IMF's report on Cyprus).
86. See What Has Been Agreed in Cyprus? CNN, March 27, 2013,
http://edition.cnn.com/2013,/03/18/business/cyprus-bank-levy-explainer (noting that
Cypriot banks lost money and need refinancing when Greece took a haircut); Q&A:
Cyprus Bailout, supra note 85 (Stating that the Greek crisis created vulnerabilities in the
Cy priot economy).
87. Q&A: Opprus Bailout, supra note 85; Richard Barley, A Cyprus Bailout Is Harder
Than It Looks, UVALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2013, at B16 ("Cyprus's banking sector is five tines
the size of its economy and held Greek debt valued at 160% of gross domestic product
in 2011.").
88. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (summarizing Cyprus econonic
crisis).
89. See Greeces Sovereign Debt Crunch: A VTy European Crisis, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6,
2010, at 75-77 (discussing the "fear of contagion"); The Economic Adjustment Programme
for Greece, supra note 4, at 11 (justifying the Greek bailout as the only method to prevent
contagion).
90. See Pavoncello, supra note 47, at 59 ("When the Greck government suddenly
revealed in late 2009 that it might not be able to honor its debts, a wave of panic spread
through the European market: Other countries in distress-Ircland, Spain, Portugal-
could sutiffer the same fate, and te Euro and Eurozone themselves could possibly
collapse."); Fear ojFear Itsel. Financial Contagion, ECONOMTST, June 25, 2011, at 33-34
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2010, the European Union pledged to rescue Greece if
necessary.9 1 EU President Herman Van Rompuy declared that
the sixteen Eurozone countries had a "shared responsibility" for
economic stability and would take "determined and
coordinated" action to safeguard financial stability."
D. European Union Agrees to Bailout Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain in Exchange for Austerity Measures
Although the Papandreou Administration enacted several
austerity measures in an attempt to regain international
investors' trust and avoid a bailout, Greece (followed by Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus) was forced to call upon the
European Union "to send the lifeboat they [had] been
promising."93 On May 2, 2010, the European Union and the IMF
agreed to C110 billion in bailout loans to help the government
pay its creditors-480 billion from the EC and ECB and C30
billion from the IMF.94 In exchange for this loan, Greece signed
the Memorandum of Understanding of Economic and Financial
Polices and the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific
Policy Conditionality, together referred to as the Memoranda of
Understanding ("MoU").95 The European Union assumed that
(explaining that a Greek default may spread to other vulnerable Eurozone countries
with high public debts, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy).
91. See Lourtic, supra note 14. at 75 (noting that the meeting that took place on
February 11 was chaired by Herman Van Rompuy who conveyed the message that the
"[E]uro area member states would take determined and coordinated action, if neceded,
to safeguard financial stability in the Euro area as a whoic"); Leo Cendorwicz, E.U
Comes to Greece's Rescue. with Strings, TIME (Feb. 11, 2010), (reporting that the
European Union pledges to financially assist Greece if called upon to do so).
92. See pra note 91 and accompanying text (summariing the European Union's
pledge to preserve the Euro).
93. Nicole Itano, Greece Asks for a Bailout, But at Wiat Cost?, TIME, Apr. 23. 2010;
see LYNN, supra note 47, at 140 (explaining that Grecce attempted to combat the criisi
until April 2010 when the Papandreou Administration threw in the towel and asked for
a bailout); Apostolis Kapsalis, Government Adopts Extraordinary Measures to Tackle
Economic Crisis, EUROFOUND, http://ww,.curofound.curopa.cu/ciro/2010/03/
articles/GR10030291.htm (last updated May 4, 2010) (" [T]he [Greek] government has
taken extraordinary economic measures to reduce both the deficit and debt.").
94. See The Economic Adjustment Programmne for Greece. supra note 4, at 26
(explaining that the program's inan cing will come through bilateral lending from the
IMF and the Euro area member states, where the EC will "coordinate and implement
tihe prograiie" and tie ECB will manage the account).
95. See generally, The Economic Adjustment Progranmefor Greece, supra note 4.
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the 110 billion loan would not only allow the Greek
government to pay its creditors but it would also encourage
international investors to regain confidence in Greece.96
Within a few months, Ireland signed MoU with the
European Union and the IMF on February 2011 for C85 billion,
while Portugal followed shortly thereafter and signed MoU in
May 2011 for C78 billion. 7 It soon became apparent that Greece
needed more aid.98 On March 13, 2012, therefore, Greece
received a second bailout for an additional C130 billion." Spain
then joined Greece, Ireland, and Portugal on July 2012 and
signed MoU for £100 billion. 0 More recently, Cyprus sign MoU
in May 2013 for C10 billion.or
These MoU stipulate that the loans would be disbursed in
installments, on the condition that Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Cyprus meet the time-specific commitments detailed
in the MoU.'1 In other words, to receive an installment of the
96. See The Economic Adjustment Programrme fir Greece, supra note 4, at 10
(identifying restoring Greece's credibility for private investment as an EU objective for
the Greek economic program).
97. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, supra note 4, at 5 (stating
that the European Union approved an C85 billion loan to Ireland in February 2011);
The Economic Adju stment Programme for Portugal, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that the
European Union agreed to a Portuguese financial program in May 2011 for C78
billion).
98. See Matsagonis, supra note 60, at 407 ("It gradually became clear that more aid
was needed."); see generally The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra
note 21.
99. See The Second Economic Adjustment Programme Jo Greece, supra note 2 1, at 4
(stating that the European Union, along with thc IMF, agreed to an additional C 130
billion loan).
100. See The Financial Sector Adjustment Programnme J Spain, supra note 21, at 2
(reporting that the European Union agreed to a Spanish financial package of C100
billion).
101. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 21, at 7
(explaining that European Union, the IMF, and Cyprus agreed to C 10 billion in May
2013).
102. See Koukiadaki, supra note 14, at 282 n.25 ("It has to be stressed here that the
loan was to be disbursed in installments, on condition that the Greck government met
a number of commuitments to service the loan according to a number of agreed
conditions and to implement the time-speciic measures set out in the Memoranda.");
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, supra note 4. at 59-73 (indicating thC
Irish reforms that nced to be completed for each quarterly review); The Economic
Adjustment Pogramme fo Portugal, supra note 4, at 58-93 (specifying the Portuguese
reforms that must be implemented for each quarterly review); The Financial Sector
Adjustment Programme for Spain, supra note 21. at 65-66 (outlining the agenda for
refinancing the banking sector frornJuly 2012 to june 2013).
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loan, these countries needed to implement "sweeping spending
cuts, steep tax increases, and an ambitious programme of
structural reforms." 10" More specifically, the MoU demanded
that Greece make significant changes to its labor law.'14
Although Greece experienced incomparable financial
distress beginning in 2009, severe economic conditions also
forced Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus to seek financial
assistance.105 In exchange for these loans, the European Union,
together with the IMF, developed country-specific austerity
packages to save the Euro.1ob The fundamental treaties and
economic policies of the European Union govern whether the
European Union has the authority to require austerity measures,
such as transforming a member state's labor relations system, in
exchange for a bailout.lo7
11. GREEK LABOR RELATIONS
Part II discusses how the European Union's efforts to
resolve the European debt crisis have transformed Greek labor
relations. Part II.A summarizes the Greek labor relations system
prior to the sovereign debt crisis. Part II.B identifies the EU
bailout measures that significantly affected Greek labor law, in
addition to noting that the implementation of the bailout
measures transformed Greek labor relations into a decentralized
system.
A. Pre-Crisis Legal Framework of the Greek Labor Relations System
Prior to the economic crisis, the Greek Constitution,
supplemented by Law 1876/1990, created the legal framework
103. Matsagonis, supra note 60, at 407; see generally The Economic Adjustment
Progranmefor Greece, supra note 4.
104. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4, at 21
(outlining the labor reform policies that the Greek government must implement).
105. See supra notes 97-100, 102 and accompanying text (explaining the Irish,
Portuguese, and Spanish MoU).
106. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (summarizing the MoU
austerity measures).
107. See supra notes 42-43, 51-53. 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
TFEU, TEU, and SGP).
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for the Greek labor relations system."o8 Article 22 of the
Constitution grants the federal government the power to
determine general working conditions by law.109 It also protects
a worker's right to supplement such laws with collective labor
agreements."l0 These agreements are either contracted through
collective bargaining, or, in the case of impasse, by arbitration. '
Moreover, Article 23 protects the right of labor organizations to
regulate their terms and conditions of employment.112
In addition to the Constitution, Law 1876/1990 structures
the labor relations system in the private sector.' 13 It creates four
types of collective labor agreements: (1) the national agreement,
(2) sectoral agreements, (3) occupational agreements, and (4)
firm agreements.114 The national agreement, referred to as the
108. See Yota Kravaritou, Greece, in HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AN) SOCIAL
BACKGROUND IN EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE 91, 91-93
(Michael Gold & Manfred Weiss cds., 1999) (explaining that the Constitution and Law
1876/ 1990 established the labor relations system in Greece); Eleni Patra, Social Dialogue
and Collective Bargaining in Times of Crisis: The Case of Greece 5-6 (International Labour
Organization, Working Paper No. 39, 2012) (summarizing the pre-crisis legal
framework by focusing on the Greek Constitution and Law 1876/1990).
109. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 22 (Greece) ("General working
conditions shall be determined by law, supplemented by collcctivc labor agreements
contracted through free negotiations and, in case of the failure of such, by rules
stipulated by arbitration.").
110. Id.
Ill . Id.
112. Id. at art. 23 ("The State shall adopt due measures safeguarding trade union
freedom and the unhindered exercise of related rights against any infringement
thereon with the limits of the law.").
113. Nonos (1990:1876) Elcutheres sullogikcs diapragmatcuscis kai alles
diatakscis [Free collective bargaining and other provisions], EPHEMERIS TES
KYVERNESEOS TEs HiEIENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1990, A:27, art. 4, 16-17
(Greece) [hereinafter Law 1876/1990). It is important to note that collective labor
agreements in the public sector are prohibited; the government sets wages and salaries.
See Patra, supra note 108, at 11 (stating that wages are set by the government in the
public sector); THEODORE KONTARIS, LABOUR LAW IN HELLAS 230-31 (2002) ("It
should be mentioned that in [Grececc] the right to conclude collcctivc agreements has
been denied to civil servants by all Hellenic governments.").
114. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 3.1 ("Collective agreements are
distinguished into: a. national general agreement covering all workers, b. scctoral
collective agreements covering employees of more identical or closely similar
enterprises or firms of a certain city or area or the whole of the country, c. firm
agreements covering employces of a company, d. national occupational agreements
covering those employees of a certain occupation in the country, e regional collective
agreements covering employees of a certam occupation in a city or region of the
country."). See Patra, supra note 108, at 6-7 (identifying four types of agreements in
Law 1876/1990: (a) the National General Collective Agreements (EOvucj lEvuaf
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National General Collective Agreement (EOvtxdt FsvtKi
Eukolyl i fqtopacyi Epyauing ("EGSEE")), sets the minimum
work standards applicable to all private sector workers. 115
The agreement is reached at the national level by the
General Confederation of Greek Workers ("GSEE"), which
represents private sector workers, and the Hellenic Federation
of Enterprises ("SEV"), Hellenic Confederation of Professionals,
Craftsmen and Merchants ("GSEVEE"), and National
Confederation of Hellenic Commerce ("ESEE"), which
represent private sector employers.' I)
Sectoral agreements cover workers in the same industry.117
Occupational agreements cover workers in the same
occupation.118 For example, a sectoral agreement may cover all
workers in the hotel industry, including accountants, cleaning
staff, event planners, et cetera."' 9 An occupational agreement, on
Irkkoyuaf E-[i3aay Epyaciaq), (b) sectoral collective agreements, (c) occupational
collective agreements, and (d) firm collective agreements); see also Voskcritsian, supra
note 20, at 11 (explaining the four types of collective agreements).
115. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 3.1 ("Collective agreements shall be
classified as follows: a national general labor agreements applicable to all workers.").
116. Kravaritou, supra note 108, at 93 ("The employers' organizations and the
trade unions arc represented at [the] national levyl on the employers' side by the
Federation of Greck Industrics (SEV), the General Confcderation of Greck Small
Businesses and Trade Unions (GSEVEE) and the Federation of the Commercial
Associations of Greece (EESE), and on the employces' side by the Greck General
Confederation of Labour (GSEE)."); Patra, supra note 108, at 6, 9-10 (cxplaining that
the National General Collective Agreement ("EGSEE") is negotiated on the employees'
side by the General Confederation of Greck Workers ("GSEE") and on the employers'
side by the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises ("SEV"), the Hellenic Confcderation of
Professionals, Craftsmen and Merchants ("GSEVEE"), and the National Confederation
of Hcllenic Commerce ("ESEE")).
117. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 3.1 ("Collective agreements are
distinguished into: . . . b. sectoral collective agreements covering employees of more
identical or closely similar enterprises or firms of a certain city or area or the whole of
the country . . . .").
118. Id. art. 3.1 ("Collective agreements are distinguished into: . . . d. national
occupational agreements covering those employeces of a certain occupation in the
country ..... ).
119. KONTARIS, supra note 113, at 230 (explaining that sectoral collective
agreements cover employees of closely similar firms of a certain city or area of the
country, whereas occupational collective agreements cover employees of a certain
occupation); Patra, supra note 108, at 6 (identifying two of the four collective
agreements as "[s]cctoral collective agreements, which cover employces in the same
sector . . . [and] [o]ccupational collective agreements (crafts), which cover employces
of the same or related occupation(s) or trades . . . .").
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the other hand, covers only workers in a specific craft, such as
tour guides.20
Lastly, firm agreements apply to workers within a
company."' Firm agreements are bargained for by local
unions.Y2 To exercise collective bargaining rights, the firm must
employ more than fifty workers.12
Firm agreements provide a decentralized option in the
Greek labor relations system by giving individual employers the
option to engage in collective bargaining.'12 Firm agreements,
however, are not common in Greece.2 According to data
available since the enactment of Law 1876/1990, only 150
companies have signed collective agreements.12 6 This occurs
because Law 1876/1990 did not afford Greek employers the
120. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (comparing sectoral and
occupational agreements).
121. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113. art. 3.1 "(Collective agreements are
distinguished into: ... c. firm agreements covering employees of a company .... "); See
KONTARIS, supra note 113, at 230 (referring to firm agreements as "single-enterprise
collective contracts: for employees of an entcierprise"): see also Patra, supra note 108, at 7
(defining firm agreements as collective agreements that cover all employees of a
certain company).
122. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 3.5 ("Enterprise agreements shall be
concluded by the enterprise unions representing all the workers concerned,
irrespective of their occupational catcgory, job or area of specialisation: where no such
union exists, the said collective agreements shall be concluded by union organisations
at the first level in the sector concerned and by the chief executive of the enterprise.").
123. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 6, 1, b ("The following shall be legally
entitled to conclude collective agreements: . . . b. any employer employing fifty (50)
workers at least.").
124. TOKE AiDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, UNIONS AND COIIFCTIVE BARGAINING:
ECONOMIC EFFLCTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 28-29 (2002) (identifying centralized
collective bargaining as occurring "when the national union confederation and the
national employers' organization can influence and control wage levels and patterns
across the econony."); Jesus Ferreiro, Decentralized Vrsus Centralized Collective
Bargaining: 1s the Collective Bargaining Structure in Spain Efficient?, 26 J. POST KFYNFSTAN
ECON. 695, 697 (2004) (explaining that decentralized collective bargaining involves
Setting wages at the firm ilel).
I 25. Yiannis Kouzis, The Impact oJ the Crisis and Labour Relations and Collective
Agreements in Greece, 3(2) INTI. LAB. RFS. 245, 249 (2011) ("According to the data
availabic, some 4,000 private sector enterprises enjoy this right, out of the 900.0000
firms registered in Greece And yet, only 150 of them have signed collective agreements
since 1990, when the law came into force."); Adreas Nikolopoulos & Elcni Patra,
Current Situation and Future Trends of the Industrial Relations System and Trade U nions in
Greece, 23 INII REV. MNIGMT. STUD. 353, 356 (2012) (explaining that employrs did not
take advantage of Law 1876/1990 to get involved in labor-management relations).
126. Kouzis, supra note 125. at 249 (citing statistics on collective labor
agreements).
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opportunity to bargain at the firm level.12 Law 1876/1990
required that companies employ at least fifty workers to exercise
collective bargaining rights.128 In a country where approximately
ninety-eight percent of companies employ less than ten workers,
it was inevitable that centralized bargaining would dominate. 1
Under this labor relations framework, most workers are
covered by more than one collective labor agreement. 10 For
example, an accountant in the hospitality industry may be
covered by all four types of agreements.' 3' As mandated by Law
1876/1990, the EGSEE (the national agreement) applies to an
accountant, as it covers all workers.' 2 Additionally, an
accountant may be covered by a sectoral agreement that applies
to all workers in the hospitality industry. 1 There may also be an
occupational agreement that covers all accountants, regardless
of where they are employed.' Lastly, an accountant may work
for a company where the employer has negotiated a firm
agreement with his/her employees.13 5 Law 1876/1990's
favorability principle establishes that the labor agreement
containing the most favorable terms to the employee prevails.1 36
127. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (quoting Law 1876/1990's
requirement for firm collective bargaining).
128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (citing the requirements for firm
collective bargaining).
129. See Voskeritsian, supr-a note 20, at 22 ("in a country where 98% of its
companies employ less than Is than ten employees ... it is fairly obvious that a vast
majority of the labour force never had any experience of firm-lcvel collective
processes.") (internal citation omitted); see also Kravaritou, supra note 108, at 100
("The structure of collective agreements has traditionally been strictly centralized and
hierarchical, and their content exceptionally limited in comparison with the situation
in other European countries.");, supra note 125, at 354 (identifying Greece as a heavily
centralized system by noting that "considerable government intervention" and a "lack
of initiativc by the Greck 'employers" dominates the industrial relations system).
130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (identifying the four types of
collective labor agreements).
131. See id. (describing the types of collectivc labor agreements).
132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the EGSEE).
133. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (comparing sectoral and
occupational agreements).
134. See upra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (distinguishing occupational
agreements from sectora agreements).
135. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing firm agreements).
136. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 10 ("Where an employment relationship
is governed by more than one collective agreement in force, the agreement containing
tihe terms most favourable to the workers shall prevail."); see Patra, supra note 108, at 7
(stating that even though an employee may be covered by more than one collective
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Moreover, Law 1876/1990 establishes that sectoral,
occupational, and firm agreements cannot contain any
provisions less favorable than the EGSEE. 137
Law 1876/1990 also establishes a dispute resolution
mechanism referred to as the Organization for Mediation and
Arbitration (Opyvto6 MccyoXppion KCut Atricxg
(OMED)). 18
Under Law 1876/1990, if the parties reach an impasse
during collective bargaining, they may call the OMED.'39 The
parties first proceed with mediation. 14( If the parties fail to reach
an agreement, the mediator has the authority to submit a
written proposal to the parties. 141 A dispute can only proceed to
agreement, the agreement containing the most favorable terms prevails); see also
Voskeritsian, supra note 20, at 11 (explaining that the favorability principle "established
a hierarchy among these difference kinds of agreements, according to which the more
decentralized agreements overruled the more centralized agreements if, and only if,
the former's terms and conditions of employment were better than the latter's.").
137. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art 3.2 ("Firm, scctoral, and occupational
collective agreements may not contain unfavorable working conditions below the
National General Collective Agreement.").
138. Id. arts. 14-16.
139. Id. art. 14.1 ("If collective bargaining fails, the interested parties have the
right to request mediation services or to apply for arbitration."). See Patra, supra note
108, at 7 ("In the case of an impasse during the negotiations towards a collective
agreement, the parties may resort to the Organization for Mediation and Arbitration
(OMED) for resolution through mediation and arbitration."); Nikolopoulos, supra
note 125 , at 356-57 (explaining that the parties may proceed to mediation and
arbitration in the case of impasse).
140. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 16.1 (identifying arbitration as an
"appeal" procedure). See Patlra, supra note 108, at 7 (cxplaining that mediation is the
main service offered when parties reach an impasse during negotiation, as it is
considered an extension of collective bargaining).
141. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 15.6 ("If the parties do not conclude an
agreement within twenty (20) working days from the day after the mediator has
assumed his duties, the mediator has the right to submit to them his own proposal (b)
If the parties do not announce in writing the acceptance of the mediator's proposal,
within five (5) working days from its communication, the proposal is considered to be
rejected The acceptance or rejection of the proposal is announced to the other party as
well The proposal of the mediator can be made public by the mediator himself in the
daily press or in periodicals."). See Patra, supra note 108, at 7 ("If the negotiating
parties fail to reach an agreement, the mediator has the right to submit a written
proposal, which may become the text for the collective agreement if the parties accept
it."); loannis D. Koudiakis, General Characteristics of the Greek Labor Law, 30 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL'Y 145, 157 (2008) (explaining that "the mediator's role expires: (a) with an
agreement that is considered a collective work agreement; (b) by certifying the failure
of mediation; or (c) through submission of his own proposal upon failure if he judges
that the dispute should be the subiect of arbitration").
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arbitration in the following scenarios: (1) by mutual consent of
the parties, (2) unilaterally if the other party refused mediation,
(3) unilaterally by the workers' organization, as long as the
mediator's proposal was accepted by the workers' organization
and rejected by the employer, or (4) by the party that accepted
the mediator's proposal, as long as it involved a firm
agreement.142 Some commentators note that these restrictions
create asymmetry, where unions have a unilateral right to
compel arbitration when the employer either rejects the
mediator's proposal or fails to participate in the mediation.143
Parliament legislated for asymmetry to mitigate the power
imbalance between unions and employer organizations fostered
under Law 3239/1954-the previous labor relations legislative
framework. 44 Under Law 3239/1955, any negotiation that did
not result in an agreement resorted to arbitration.145 To
encourage social dialogue and good faith collective bargaining,
142. Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 16.1 ("An appeal to arbitration can
occur: a by mutual consent of the parties, b) unilaterally if the other party refused
mediation, c) unilaterally by the workers' organization, as long as the mediator's
proposal was accepted by workers' organization and rejected by the employer, or d) by
the party that accepted the mediator's proposal, as long as it involved a firm
agreement.").
143. See Voskeritsian, supra note 20, at 13 (identifying the arbitration system as
asymmetrical because unions arc granted the unilateral right to compel arbitration);
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4, at 68 (recognizing that
Greece has an asymmetrical arbitration process by requiring that the government
amend Law 1876/1990 "so that both parties can resort to arbitration if they disagree
with the proposal of the mediator").
144. See Voskeritsian, supra note 20, at 14-5 ("Given the power imbalance in the
employment relationship, the legislator chose to benefit the trade unions with the right
to unilaterally revrt to arbitration if they encountered an unbcndablc employer's
association, and the negotiations reached a deadlock This right was, in other words, a
'Wcapon' at the hands of the unions to persuade the employers to take negotiations
scriously and to approach the negotiating table in a cooperative way."); Nikolopoulos,
supra note 125, at 360 (stating that arbitration has operated in a liberal way, where
wages have been approximately ten percent higher than the national general collective
agreement).
145. Nomos (1955:3239) Peri tropou ruthmiseos ton sillogikon diaforon ergasias,
sustascos ethnikou Gnoiodotikou Siivouliou Koinonikis Politikis kai tropopoiscos kai
sumbliroscos diatakscos diatakeon enion ergatikon nomon [Measures to regulate
collective disputes, national advisory and social policy recommendations, and
amending and supplementing labor law provisions], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES
HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.KE.D.] 1955, A:834 (Grccc) (providing no restrictions
for appealing to the arbitration process when the parties reached impasse).
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therefore, Parliament granted unions the unilateral right to
proceed to arbitration.14 6
B. The European Union's Effect on Greek Labor Law
The Greek labor relations system was significantly
transformed when Parliament agreed to accept the EU bailout
in exchange for implementing severe austerity measures J47The
European Union's austerity measures insisted on reducing labor
costs.148 Specifically, the European Union outlined the following
demands: (1) eliminate the principle of favorability, (2) remove
asymmetry in the arbitration system, and (3) decentralize
collective bargaining.14  The European Union insisted that these
labor law reforms were necessary to boost competitiveness in
order to emerge from the crisis. 15o
To ensure receipt of the first loan installment, Parliament
quickly enacted several statutes. On May 6, 2010, only a few days
after signing the 2010 MoU, Parliament enacted Law
3845/2010.151 Among other provisions, Law 3845/2010 directly
responded to the European Union's demands for labor law
reform by eliminating the favorability principle established in
Law 1876 /1990.' Law 3846/2010 and Law 3863/2010, on the
146. See supra, notes 144-46 and accompanying text (rationalizing arbitration
asymmetry).
147. See generally, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4: The
Second Econoric Adjustment Progranmefor Greece supra note 21.
148. See The Economic Adfustment Programnme for Greece, supra note 4, at 22
(demanding labor reform "to curb undue wage pressure"); The Second Economic
Adjustment Progranme for Greece, supra note 21, at 3 (pointing to labor cost reductions as
the primary goal for labor reform).
149. The Economic Adjustment Progranmme for Greece, supra note 4, at 68 (declaring
that Greece "allow [occupational] pacts to set wage growth below sectoral
agreements[,]" "amend regulation of the arbitration system[,]" and "adopt[]
legislation to reform wage bargaining in the private sector."): see supra notes 136. 143
and accompanying text (defining the favorability principle and asymmetry).
150. The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4, at 48 (stating that
Greece strengthen its structural policies "in order to boost competitiveness and emerge
from the crisis quickly")'.
151. Nomos (2010:3845) Metra gia tin efarmogi tou mixanisou stiriksis tis ellinikis
oikononias apo ta krati-meli tis Zonis tou curo kai to Dicthnes Nornismatiko Tancio
[Measures for the application of the support mechanism of the Greek economy by the
Euro Member States and the International Monetary Fund], EPHEMERIS TES
KYVERNLSEOS TES HELLNIKLS DEMOYJRATIAS [E.KE.D.] 2010, A:65 (Greece).
152. Id. art. 2.7 (" [T]hc terms of occupational and company level agreements may
deviate from the respective terms of sectoral collective agreements and national
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other hand, only amended employment law.15 3 More specifically,
Law 3846/2010 amended employment law issues, such as part-
time work, and Law 3863/2010 concentrated on pensions and
social security.154 Although Greece recognized that it needed to
implement the European Union's demands for labor law reform
to receive the loan, Parliament primarily focused on
employment law to avoid transforming its labor relations
system.1n5
In August of 2010, the European Union in its first quarterly
review expressed its disappointment in the lack of labor law
reform.156 Even though the European Union recognized that
Greece was ahead of the December 2010 deadline, it requested
further improvements and emphasized that "labour market
rules could be brought further into line with the best practices
in other European countries and the common principles of
flexicurity."'57 The European Union insisted on labor law
general collective agreements and the terms of sectoral collective agreements may
deviate from the respective terms of general collective agreements. ").
153. Nonos (2010:3846) Egguiscis gia tin crgasiaki asfalcia kai alles diatakscis
[Guarantees for employment security and other provisions], EPHEMLRIS TES
KyVTRNESEOS TES HFii.ENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.1 2010, A:66 (Greece)
[hereinafter Law 3846/2010]; Nomos (2010:3863) Neo Asfalistiko Sustina kai sunafcis
diatakscis ruthmiscis stis crgastikes shcscis [New Public Insurance System and other
provisions, arrangements in labor relations], EPHEMFERIS TES KyVTRNESEOS TFS
HIFIENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2010, A:115 (Greece) [hereinafter Law
3863/2010].
154. Id. art. 2 (entitled "Part-time Work"); Law 3863/2010, supra note 153
(outlining the provisions of pension reform).
155. See supra, notes 153-55 and accompanying text (explaining how Parliament,
with the exception of Law 3846/2010, attempted to satisfy the European Union's
demand by amending employment law).
156. See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: First Review - Summer 2010
42 (Directorate-General for Lonomic and Financial Affairs, Eur. Comm'n, Occasional
Paper No. 68, 2010), available at http://cc.curopa.cu/cconomyfinancc/publicatioIs/
occasional-paper/2010/pdf/ocp68_cn.pdf (suggesting that Greece implement labor
reforms to (1) extend probationary periods for new jobs to one year, (2) facilitate the
use of temporary and part-time contracts, (3) provide a dcearer legal framework for
firm agreements that allows firm agreement to prevail over other 1cvels. and (4) reform
the arbitration system by guaranteeing non-interference from the government).
157. The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: First Review - Summer 2010,
supra note 156, at 42. Flcxicurity is a concept coined by the European Union to
establish an optimal balance between labor market Iexibility - easy hiring and firing
inechanisms - and security for employees against labor market risks. See Flexicurity,
EuROFOUND, http://www.curofound.curopa.cu/ ar as/ indusLriaelations/ dictLionary/
delinitions/FLEXICURIT.hun (last updated june 5, 2008) (defining Ilexicurity as the
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reform-eliminating arbitration asymmetry and decentralizing
collective bargaining.158
Despite the European Union's demands for labor law
reform, Parliament enacted Law 3871/2010 on August 17, 2010
to amend employment law.' ' Law 3871/2010 froze wages for
2010 and the first month of 2011.10 As expected, the European
Union was not pleased with Greece's refusal to reform its labor
law.161
In its second review, the European Union, once again,
demanded arbitration reform and collective bargaining
decentralization. 162
After several months of avoiding labor law reform,
Parliament enacted Law 3899/2010 on December 7, 2010 and
initiated the first move toward decentralizing collective
bargaining.16 First, Parliament legislated that associations of
persons (svoig itpoac6rov) may collectively bargain at the firm
level, where a local union does not exist.164 Second, Parliament
introduced special firm-level collective agreements
optimal balance between labour market flexibility and security for employees against
labour market risks").
158. See upra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the European Union's
labor reform demands).
159. Nomos (2010:3871) Dimosiononiki Diahcirisi kai Euthuni [Fiscal
management and responsiblity], EPHEMERIS TFS KYVERNESEOS TES HFiLNTKES
DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2010, k:141 (Greece) [hereinafter Law 3871/2010].
160. Id.
I 1. See The Economnic Adjustment Programme for Greece: Second Review - Autan 2010
29 (Dire ctoratc-General for Economic and Financial Afairs, Eur. Comm'n, Occasional
Paper No. 72, 2010), available at hittp://cc.curopa.cu/cconomyfinance/publicatioIS/
occasionalpaper/2010/pdf/ocp72_en.pdf (explaining that two key items are in the
short-term agenda: (1) reforming the arbitration system to introduce symmetric access,
and (2) reforming the wage bargaining system to enable firm agreement to prevail over
all other agreements).
162. See supra notes 149, 156-59, 161 and accompanying text (stating that the
European Union pushed for labor reform in the MoU, the first quarterly review, and
the second quarterly review).
163. Nonos 2010:3899 Epigonta inetra cfarmyrogis tout programinatos stiriksis tes
elinikis oinoionias [Urgent measures for inplementing the support program for tihe
Greek economy], EPHEMERTS TFS KYVTRNESEOS TES HiLLENIKES DFMOKRATIAS
[E.K.E.D.] 2010, A:212 (Grecce) [hereinafter Law 3899/2010]; see Voskcritsian, supra
note 20, at 11 ("The importance of the new law for the instituLtiols of collective
bargaining cannot be overstated, as it brought fundamental changes to the existing
system of collective bargaining and constituted the first actual attempt for the push
[owards its decentrali[z]ation.").
164. See Law 3899/2010, supra note 163, art. 13.3.
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("SFLCAs").165 This new type of collective agreement allowed
any company to create a collective labor agreement, as long as
the Council of Social Enforcement of the Labor Inspectorate
had confirmed that the company was facing serious financial
problems.'@ Contrary to the European Union's demands,
SFLCAs did not completely decentralize collective bargaining, as
they were only permitted in companies facing serious financial
problems.167
Lastly, Law 3899/2010 eliminated asymmetry in the
arbitration system.'6 In other words, both parties had the
authority to unilaterally compel arbitration.' 9 This contradicts
Parliament's intent to encourage social dialogue and good faith
collective bargaining, as unions and ermployers now have the
unilateral right to request arbitration under Law 3899/2010.170
Nonetheless, the European Union was still not pleased with
Greece's efforts to decentralize collective bargaining.' 7'
165. See id. art. 13.3 ("To implement the provisions of paragraph one [the special
firm collective agreement], the Parties shall Jointly submit a report to the Council of
Social Enforcement of the Inspectorate of Labor indicating the reasons for their
mntention to prepare a special operational collective agreement.").
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (defining special firm-level
collective agreemelnts ("SFLCAs")).
167. See The Econonic Adjustment Programinte for Greece: Third Review -
Winter 2010 32-34: (Directorate-G eneral for Economic and Financial Affairs, Eur.
Comm'mn, Occasional Paper No. 77 2011) (explaining that the European Union
disapproved of the SFLAs, as they were only limited to conpanies with financial
difficulty instead of applying to all companies) ; Voskeritsian, supra note 20, at 12
(" [T]he law adopted a more social perspective by not lkgalising the move towards the
coiplete decentralisation of collctive bargaining").
168. Law 3899/2010, supra note 163, art. 16 ("Proceedings may be brought to
arbitration unilaterally in the following cases: a) by any party, if the other party refused
to inediate, or b) by any party after the subinission of the proposal mediation if both
parties attended and participated in the mediation.").
169. See Patra, supra note 108. at 18 (translating the new terns for proceeding to
arbitration and indicating that both parties may proceed to arbitration); Voskeritsian,
supra note 20, at 13-14 ("Under the auspices of the new law, the asymmetry wvas lifted,
thus making it possible for any negotiating party to resort to arbitration.").
170. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing the rationalc for
asymmetry).
171. See The Economic Adjustment Progranrnefor Greece: Third Review - Winter 2010,
supra note 167, at 32-34 (indicating that Greece needed to take further steps to
decentralize collective bargaining).
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In its third review, the European Union criticized the
SFLCAs. 172 The European Union noted that the SFLCAs should
not be limited to companies facing serious financial problems.1
It emphasized that they should be used as a "powerful
instrument to increase employment and improve
competitiveness."1 74
In response to the European Union's third review, Greece
enacted Law 4024/2011 to truly decentralize collective
bargaining.'17  Law 4024/2011 not only eliminated the SFLCAs
but it also enabled firm agreements to prevail over sectoral
agreements.17 6 As a result, any employer who chooses to engage
in collective bargaining may now create a collective labor
agreement that prevails over all sectoral and occupational
agreements.1  Moreover, Law 4024/2011 also permits
associations of persons to bargain firm agreements, if no local
union exists. 17,
The European Union's response to the sovereign debt crisis
has altered labor relations in Greece. Prior to the debt crisis and
the MoU, the Greek Constitution and Law 1876/1990 created a
legislative framework where workers benefited from (1) a
centralized collective bargaining system, (2) the favorability
principle, and (3) arbitration asymmetry. 70 To receive the
European Union loan, however, Greece transformed its labor
relations system.180
172. See id, at 33 (criticizing the SFILAs for limiting their applicability to only
companies in financial difficulty).
173. See id., at 33 ("The government tends to see the new law and the special firm-
level collective agreements [] as a tool for only limited wage decentralisation targeted
to firms in difficulty, rather than promoting it as a powerful insurument to increase
employment and improve competitiveness.").
174. See id., at 33.
175. See Law 4024/2011, supra note 25.
176. Id. art. 37.5.
177. See upra notes 114, 137 and accompanying text (explicating the four types of
collective labor agreimncnts and the principle of favorability).
178. See Law 4024/2011, supra note 25. art. 37.
179. See upra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (summarizing the Greek labor
relations framew ork prior to the crisis).
180. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (addressing how the European
Union's austerity measures transformed Greek labor law).
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO
TR4NSFORM GREECE'S LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM
This Part argues that the European Union, as the primary
bailout lender, lacks the authority to transform Greece's labor
relations system. Part III.A concludes that the fundamental
treaties of the European Union do not grant it the authority to
demand changes to member state labor law. Part I.B argues
that the European Union's demand for labor law reform creates
a power imbalance in the employer's favor. Lastly, Part III.C
argues that labor law reform is a misguided austerity measure.
A. Neither The Founding Treaties of The European Union \or
Subsequent Economic Policies Grant the European Union Authority To
Demand Changes To Member State Labor Law
Even if the TFEU authorizes member state bailouts, the
European Union lacks the authority to demand changes to
member state labor law.181 Prior to enduring the unfortunate
effects of the debt crisis, Greece joined the European Union and
the Eurozone by agreeing to the provisions of the European
Union's founding treaties and the subsequent economic
policies. 82 In these agreements, Greece did not relinquish
sovereignty over its labor law.18 The formation of the EMU in
the TEU did not transfer sovereignty over member state labor
law to the European Union.
Moreover, the SGP did not grant the European Union
authority to impose changes to member state labor law to meet
fiscal requirements.S)
181. See infra Part Ill.A. 1-2 (discussing the TEU and the SGP).
182. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (explaining the conditions in
which Grece joined the European Union and the Eurozone)
183. See infra Part III.A.1-2 (concluding that the establishment of the EMU in the
TEU and the SGP economric policy do not grant the European Union the authority to
demand changes to Grecccs labor law).
184. See infra Part 11.A.1 (arguing that member states did not transfer sovereignty
over their labor laws by agrecing to the TEU's EMU provisions).
185. See infra Part II.A.2 (stating that the SGP includes no provision limiting a
member state's sovereignty over its labor laws).
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1. Formation of the European Monetary Union Did Not
Relinquish Member State Sovereignty Over Labor Law
With the formation of the EMU, member states agreed to
transfer parts of their sovereignty to the European Union in
order to achieve economic integration.' No member state,
however, agreed to relinquish sovereignty over its labor laws.' 87
Under the principle of subsidiarity, the European Union may
act under two circumstances: (1) in an area of its exclusive
competence or (2) if the proposed action is best achieved at the
EU level.'18 Labor law is not listed as an area of exclusive
competence in the TFEU.'"8 Moreover, the European Union has
legislated that labor law is not best determined at the EU level.191o
According to Article 156 of the TFEU, the European Union only
has the authority to encourage cooperation between member
states by "making studies, delivering opinions[,] and arranging
consultations" to improve working conditions.'9' Member states,
therefore, retain sovereignty over national labor law.'019
Additionally, the economic policies enumerated in the
TFEU do not relinquish a member state's sovereignty over labor
law.19 In fact, Article 126 1[7 states, "Where . . . an excessive
deficit exists, [the EU] shall adopt . . . recommendations
addressed to the member state."l94 Therefore, no provision in
186. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (idcntifying the areas of exclusive
EU competence).
187. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that labor law is not an
exclusive area of EU Competence).
188. SeeTFU post-Lisbon, supra note 27, art. 5, 2010 0,] C 83, at 18.
189. See TFEU, supra note 27, art. 3, 2010 0,J C 83, at 51
190. See id. art. 156, at 117 (stating that the European Commission "shall
encourage cooperation between the [rn]ember [s]tates and facilitate the coordination
of their action in . . . labour and working conditions"). The TFEU states that the
European Union shall encourage cooperation "by making studies, delivering
opinions[,] and arranging consultations both on problems arising at the national level
and on those of concern to international organisations." Id.
191. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (quoting TFEU Artidce 156);
TFEU, supra note 27, art. 151, 2010 0. C 83, at 114 (explaining that the European
Union and incnbcr states "shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment,
improved living and working conditions").
192. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (clarifying the European
Union's involvement in member state labor law).
193. See TFEU, supra note 27, art. 126, 2010 0.J C 83. at 100.
194. Id. art. 126, at 100 (emphasis added).
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the TFEU authorizes the European Union to demand specific
changes to a member state's laws. 9
2. Stability and Growth Pact Preserves Member State Sovereignty
Over Labor Law
The European Union's economic policy, specifically the
SGP, also fails to grant authority to demand changes to member
state labor law.16 Even though the SGP explicitly prohibits
member state budget deficits from exceeding three percent of
GDP, the SGP allows member states "to take the corrective
budgetary action they deem necessary to meet the objectives of
their stability or convergence."'97 In other words, the SGP does
not authorize the European Union to demand legislative
changes to member states failing to meet the proscribed fiscal
criteria.'"
B. The European Union's Inposed Labor Law Reform Creates a Power
Balance in Favor of the Employer
The European Union's disregard for Greece's sovereignty
has severely transformed the country's labor relations system.'"
By demanding that Greece decentralize collective bargaining,
eradicate the favorability principle, and eliminate asymmetrv in
the arbitration system, the European Union has created a power
imbalance in the employer's favor.:oo In legislating Law
1876/1990, the pre-crisis labor relations framework, Parliament
did not intend to create such a power imbalance.201
195. See generally TFEU, supra note 27, 2010 0.J C 83.
196. See Council Resolution of 17 June 1997, supra note 28, 1997 0J. C 236/ 1, at
1-2 (stating that inember states must meet the fiscal criteria through measures decided
by each member statc- not the European Union).
197. Council Resolution of 17 june 1997, supra note 28, 1997 OJ C 236/ 1, at 1-2
(emphasis added).
198. See supra note 54-57 and accompanying tcxt (discussing the SGP's
requirements).
199. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (comparing thc differences
between Greek labor relations before and after the debt crisis).
200. See upra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the European Union's
demand for labor law reform).
201. See supra notcs 144-47 and accompanying text (sunminarizing ParliantcI's
intent).
20131 GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT & LABOR REL4TIONS 1551
Decentralizing collective bargaining and eliminating the
favorability principle creates a power imbalance, as it forces
inexperienced workers to organize and negotiate with their
employers for the first time.202 Until Greece signed the MoU, the
labor relations system was strictly centralized: 0 There was
almost no opportunity for firm collective bargaining because
Law 1876/1990 only permitted firm agreements in companies
employing fifty or more workers. 04 Since ninety-eight percent of
Greek companies employ less than ten employees, workers have
had little or no experience in organizing or advocating for their
rights at the firm-level.2 1 Workers, therefore, historically
depended on sectoral and occupational collective agreements.2oo
With the elimination of the favorability principle and the
decentralization of collective bargaining, employers now have
the opportunity to implement collective bargaining agreements
and exploit the working class during negotiations2
To avoid enduring drastic wage decreases and benefit
reductions during the debt crisis, workers must quickly organize
and learn how to negotiate a favorable collective labor
agreement.208
Eliminating asymmetry in the arbitration process also shifts
the balance of power to the employer.Mo To encourage social
dialogue and good faith collective bargaining, Parliament
enacted Law 1867/1990 to grant unions the unilateral power to
compel arbitration if negotiations reached a deadlock.210 In
202. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (stating the limited use of firm
agreements).
203. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that centralized
collective bargaining has dominated in Greece).
204. See Law 1876/1990, supra note 113, art. 6, 1. b.
205. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of irm
agreements).
206. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that centralized
collective bargaining has played a dominant role in Greek labor relations).
207. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (defining firm agreements).
208. See supra notes 125, 129 and accompanying text (noting that workers relied
on sectoral and occupational agreements, as firm agreements wvere not common in
Greece).
209. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (explaining 1876/1990s
asymmetry in arbitration and its purpose).
210. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining the conditions under
which parties may resort to arbiration prior to Greece implcntlLing Lhe MoU's
demands).
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essence, Parliament sought to create a weapon for unions to use
to persuade employers to bargain in good faith.211 Without
asymmetry, employers have the power to avoid good faith
collective bargaining by immediately compelling arbitration.
C. The European Union's Labor Law Reform is Misguided
The European Union's demand to reform labor law as a
condition for receiving the bailout is misguided.212 The
European Union's demand fails to recognize that public sector
spending-not the private sector-caused the debt crisis, along
with institutional failures in the European Union.13 Greece's
budget deficit and debt amounted to 15.8% and 114.7% of GDP,
respectively, mostly due to irresponsible government
spending.1 4 Upon joining the Eurozone in 2001, Greece
exploited its access to low interest rates by heavily increasing
public spending.21' Between 2000 and 2009, for example, public
sector wages increased by approximately a hundred percent -
11.4% of GDP.216 Since the labor relation system sets wages in
the private sector, labor law reform will not reduce public
spending or cut the budget deficit.21 Therefore, the European
Union's demand for labor law reform is misguided because it
will not affect Greece's ability to emerge from the crisis.2 '
This, however, does not imply that implementing austerity
measures in the public sector will enable Greece to emerge from
the crisis.21 9 Several prominent economists argue that austerity
211. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (explicating the purpose of
arbitration asymmetry).
212. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (stating that irresponsible
government spending, as well as failed EU institutions, caused the crisis).
213. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (indicating the causes of the
criis).
214. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (reporting the 2009 budget deficit
and debt statistics).
215. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the causes of the
debt crisis).
216. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (providing statistics on public
sector wages).
217. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (summariing Greek labor law).
218. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (stating that Greek labor law only
applies to the private sector).
219. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (idcntf ying the failure of EU
institutions as another major cause of the European debt crisis).
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measures will not work to resolve the European debt crisis. 2 0 In
fact, the empirical study developed by Harvard University
economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff to argue for
austerity has been criticized for making an Excel spreadsheet
error, which ultimately raises doubt as to the validity of the
study's finding: that economic growth severely suffers when a
country's public debt level reaches ninety percent of GDP.221
Moreover, the IMF released a study where it argues that upfront
debt restricting in 2010 would have been more desirable than
austerity.222 Regardless, the European Union's decision to
reform labor law in the private sector is misguided.221
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that by signing the MoU, Greece agreed
to implement the prescribed austerity measures to receive the
desperately needed loans from the IMF and the European
Union.224 The issue is whether the European Union has the
authority to impose such austerity measures on a member state
enduring an unprecedented economic crisis. 225 To answer this
220. See Paul Krugman, The Big Fail, N.X. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at A19 ("The crisis
in Greece was taken, wrongly, as a sign that all governments had better slash spending
and delicits right away. Austerity becarne the order of the day, and supposed experts
who should have known better cheered the process on, while the warnings of some
(but not enough) economists that austerity would derail recovery were ignored."):
joseph Stiglitz, Austerity Not the Way to Go fir Europe, 11W NEWS. Oct. 3. 2011,
http://wwv.bbc.co.uk/nevs/business-15110053 (arguing that limiting fiscal delicits
through severe austerity measures will not end the debt crisis).
221. See Brad Plumer, 1s the Evidence jr Austerity Based on an Excel Spreadsheet
Error?, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2013 (disusing the excel error made by Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, well-known Harvard economists, in their fanious 2010
study); Eamon Murphy, Math in Time of Excel: Economists' Error Undermines njluential
Paper. DAILY FINANCE, Apr. 19, 2013 ("Now the most influential product of [Reinhart
and Rogoffs] collaboration-an argument widely considered to have helped lay the
basis for the West's recent shift toward austerity economics - has been shown to rest in
large part on a simple error, a spreadsheet coding mistake . . .
222. See International Monetary Fund, Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional
Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement, at 26-28, IMF Country Report No.
13/156 (June 2013) (arguing that debt restructuring should have been pursued in
Greece).
223. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (explaining that the Greece's
economic crisis partially stens from political irresponsibility in the public sector).
224. See generally The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 4.
225. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (summarizing the scope of the
European Union's authority under the TFEU, TEU, and SGP).
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question, we must look to the conditions under which Greece
joined the Eurozone-prior to the crisis.2 Greece adopted the
Euro as its currency according to the policies prescribed in the
TEU and the TFEU.2 These fundamental EU treaties, along
with the economic policies that followed, do not authorize the
European Union to infringe upon Greece's sovereignty to save
the Euro.228
Unfortunately, Greece's dire economic situation has
prevented the Greek government from pursuing any course of
action that may jeopardize receiving the next installment of the
loan:" As a result, Greece has adopted the European Union's
persistent demands to reform its labor law by decentralizing
collective bargaining, eradicating the favorability principle, and
eliminating asymmetry in the arbitration process. 230 Considering
Greece's historically centralized labor relations system, the
sovereign debt crisis and the European Union's demands may
severely limit the Greek working class' ability to bargain
collectively.2 I Reacting to these unfortunate circumstances, the
Greek people, along with several other European citizens, will
demonstrate outside of their parliaments.232 No to the
prosecution of the working class!"3 No more sacrifices!234
226. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (noting the conditions under
which Greece joined the Euro prior to the economic crisis).
227. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (referring to the TEU and the
TFEU).
228. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing the European
Union's scope of authority).
229. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that Grecce needed to
follow the MoU quarterly requirements to receive each installment of the loan).
230. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining the transformation of
Greck labor relations).
231. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (describing Grccccs
centralized labor relations systern).
232. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (illustrating the demonstrations
occurring throughout Europe).
233. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (showing the anti-austerity
chants).
234. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (reporting on Lhe European
protests).
